The Racial Infrastructure of the Terror-Industrial Complex

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The Globality of the Terror-Industrial Complex

Operational flexibility: This is a highly classified area. All I want to say is that there was “before” 9/11 and “after” 9/11. After 9/11 the gloves come off.
—Cofer Black, former director of the CIA Counterterrorism Center, testimony at September 2002 Joint House/Senate Intelligence Committee Hearing

In an October 2007 interview with GQ Magazine, former secretary of state and retired four-star general Colin Powell warned of something he termed the terror-industrial complex. Referencing the proliferation of fear in relation to security and military force, Powell portrayed a picture of multifaith tolerance and systemic fear attached to political processes and electoral politics. Musing from his office in Alexandria, Virginia, across the Potomac River from Washington, DC, he described this dilemma as follows:

You can drive up the road from here and come to a spot where there is a megachurch over here, a little Episcopal church over there, a Catholic church around the corner that’s almost cathedral-size, and between them is a huge Hindu temple. There are no police needed to guard any of this. There are not many places in the world where you would see that. Yes, there are a few dangerous nuts in Brooklyn and New Jersey who want to blow up Kennedy Airport and Fort Dix. These are dangerous criminals, and we must deal with them. But come on, this is not a threat to our survival! The only thing that can really destroy us is us. We shouldn’t do it to ourselves, and we shouldn’t use fear for political purposes—scaring people to death so they will vote for you, or scaring people to death so that we create a terror-industrial complex.1

The scene Powell portrays situates mainstream American Christianity with an assumed other of Hinduism, and a notable avoidance of any direct reference to Islam, with a now familiar exhortation of the exceptionalism of the United States. And this may be the point: one does not need to mention Islam to use the dog-whistle terms that imply Muslims in the War on Terror. That there is a fear of a few “dangerous” elements threatening the “survival” of the entire system betrays a deeper issue at hand. Powell’s description contains an implicit assumption that Islam is a ubiquitous category of other that need not be named for it to lurk otherwise in the thoughts of readers. This of course is an accepted conceit of the post-9/11 world, in which the War on Terror has created a media subtext of any and all forms of terror. Earlier in the interview Powell used the pronoun they to describe “terrorists” in comparing the “American way of life” as stronger than threats of death and the destruction of property, again the presumption that war and violence are already givens in the landscape of the democratic future of the United States. The dangerous elements in Brooklyn and New Jersey that Powell referred to are an evocative object, one that names something without specifics and in a language that is understood as a proliferation of unending possibility.

Like Eisenhower’s famous warning of a military-industrial complex in 1961, Powell raises this issue of a terror-industrial complex somewhat in passing to tout a sense of American superiority—a “we are better than this” sort of mentality that situates the democratic political system as the highest form of collective decision making and prosperity. For much of the mainstream media at the time, the mention of the terror-industrial complex failed to make an impact. In large part, this warning from Powell was a side conversation to the lead of the story. In this same interview Powell issued an apology, admitting that he had made a mistake in reporting to the United Nations that the US government had information regarding weapons of mass destruction in Iraq. The reference to the terror-industrial complex stayed buried until 2009, when Keith Olbermann of MSNBC broadcast a video interview with Colin Powell from 2007. Here campus journalists from the University of Oklahoma newspaper the Oklahoma Daily had asked him to expand on the idea shortly after he made his original statement. Powell responded by elaborating his description of the concept of the terror-industrial complex as follows:

We’re spending an enormous amount of money on Homeland Security. And I think we should spend whatever it takes. But I think we have to be careful that we don’t get so caught up in trying to throw money at the terrorist and counter-terrorist problem that we essentially are creating an industry that will only exist as long as you keep the terrorist threat pumped up... We spend a lot of money to put a lot of equipment out there, kind of terrorism
equipment. But now we need more money to keep that equipment running. Well, let’s make sure that what we have sent out there is absolutely essential. And let’s be cautious in our appropriations and in spending money. I don’t think we’re out of control, I think we had to respond in an aggressive way. But it’s now been six years. Let’s make sure we’re spending money on the right things, and not spending money just to spend money.²

This unusual admission of spending on the “terrorist and counter-terrorist problem” is wrapped in the standard conservative discourse of fiscal restraint and government downsizing. Powell makes apparent that the term terror-industrial complex describes a relationship with money, or financial capital, in which the threat of terrorism supersedes actually existing danger, in other words, spending money in the aims of gaining an upper hand in a security situation that requires an adept military industry.

In a similar vein, James Risen has recently called this formation the Homeland Security–industrial complex to reference the proliferation of companies seeking military contracts to provide the infrastructure of the Global War on Terrorism.³ In making a distinction from the military-industrial complex, Risen describes this system thus: “The new homeland security-complex operates differently. It is largely made up of a web of intelligence agencies and their contractors, companies that mostly provide secret services rather than large weapons systems and equipment. These contractors are hired to help Washington determine the scale and scope of the terrorist threat; they make no money if they determine that the threat is overblown or, God forbid, if the war on terror ever comes to an end.”⁴ Risen refers to details shared by these conceptual approaches through an explicit mandate through independent contractors while also highlighting a temporal frame of the security obsession with terror. This system that is so concerned with combating terrorism is indeed premised on a fundamental shift in military combat that reimagines the terms of war and the notion of an enemy. Propagating this in terms of a future sense of permanence and fixity, there is a financial interest for those who predict terrorism in such static terms. In other words, this is a system of war with no end, and the fulfillment of a system of racial capitalism that I describe as racial infrastructure. Infrastructure in the Marxist usage refers to the means of production and the category of class, or what might be referred to more generally as economic and social position. While infrastructure connotes the basic physical and organizational facilities from which society or a social system operates, I am here referring to racial infrastructure as a spatial formation in which the social, political, and economic relationships of racial systems operate through dominance and discursive power.

What I find instructive in the examples used by Risen and a range of reportage on the post-9/11 security state and the War on Terror is
the unspoken racialization of terror with Islam and Muslims. Certainly, Risen and others are critical of how the War on Terror fixates on Islam through an oversimplified syllogism that equates Muslims with terrorism, yet as I argue in what follows, the impact of the terror-industrial complex is far more extreme than a representational mistake based in the fearmongering of Islam and Muslims. Rather, it is the larger systems of structural violence that are normalized through the workings of concepts such as race and permanent war that create an unprecedented flexibility in the workings of social domination and capital accumulation. As an ideological structure it is present in a range of security and biopolitical technologies, including, for example, policing, health care, social services, and the framing of criminality and illegality in the detention and deportation regime. Whereas the military-industrial complex conjoined national military and political forces with the arms industry, the shift toward the private sector to conduct military and intelligence operations is part of the transition into the twenty-first-century development of the terror-industrial complex and what others such as Risen refer to in terms of security. Although the concomitant or analogous construction to terror in this sense is security, a concept that has often been used in political theory, I prefer to think through these conjoined forces using the notion of terror. Security is certainly an important ideological piece of how the terror-industrial complex is deployed, alongside other representations of state power such as surveillance. However, terror also indicates the shift from institutions of power to amorphous ideas so endemic in the rubrics of the War on Terror.

The terror-industrial complex has dramatically shaped and altered social life across geographic locations with dramatic differences in scale. The wide-ranging escalation of structural and physical violence through war include, for example, the use of drones in targeted assassination and surveillance of social life, the everyday conditions of military occupation through means of war and governance, domestic and foreign mass surveillance, the militarization of policing domestically, and the use of surveillance and intelligence gathering by local law enforcement in collaboration or modeled after domestic and international spying agencies. Recent scholarship has begun to chip away at these deep transformations to social life that are guided by the racialization of Islam and Muslims. It is in this sense that, while the Obama administration no longer uses the specific term War on Terror to describe what rapidly developed under the Bush years after 9/11, the expansion of the security and surveillance state has brought the enormous apparatus of the terror-industrial complex into full bloom.

Drawing on ethnographic fieldwork of the everyday in a New York neighborhood in the decades following the domestic US War on Terror,
my analysis and observations describe how the terror-industrial complex is now interwoven in Muslim life. Examining this as structural violence, I focus on quotidian shifts that mark and connect notions of terror through surveillance, policing, and disciplining in what can only be described as a normalization of permanence that in itself represents a range of other possibilities and innovations, which nonetheless are the contentious manufacturing of ways of life. Here I draw on what Nikhil Singh refers to as the racial liberalism of permanent war to describe the structural violence of an emergent racial infrastructure of the War on Terror. This is a system perpetuated by the terror-industrial complex and histories of racial formation and global white supremacy.

This essay expands on these three main concepts, racial becoming, racial infrastructure, and the terror-industrial complex, to discuss an emergent formation of how the concept of race has been imagined by the counterterror state in relation to Islam and Muslims. I argue that these concepts are part of the social system that I describe as a process of racialization unique to an incipient turn in twenty-first-century racial formation. While elements of this racial formation are not entirely new and have been in the making for some time, I draw on recent insights into the theorization of racism to describe the components of anti-Muslim racism. The concept of racial becoming ties racial infrastructure to the terror-industrial complex in an arrangement from which ideologies and tactics of the counterterror state circulate. The impact of the terror-industrial complex in the malleability of social relations is a central feature of what I refer to as the racial infrastructure of the state mediation of everyday life. Here I am thinking of infrastructure in the way Achille Mbembe describes the spatiality of apartheid and occupation in South Africa and Palestine as a form of racial social control. While he astutely points out spatial divisions and boundary making through walls, roads, and camps, I also gesture to how these partitions are made everyday in spaces of habitation and sociality. In this regard I also build on the generative scholarship of Ruth Wilson Gilmore and Laleh Khalili, whose works bring modes of incapacitation in the prison industrial complex in conversation with the technologies of detention, rendition, and torture of the War on Terror. The phrase the gloves come off declared by Cofer Black in the opening epigraph represents a temporal frame of state-sanctioned violence rather than simply inaugurating a new phase that is tied to histories of counterinsurgency that Khalili has so astutely described. Racial infrastructures are not entirely new. As I show in my ethnographic examples, the way they are being used and to what end provide insight into their application in the logic of the War on Terror. A key point that this application depends is the racialization of Islam and Muslims.
Muslim Racial Becoming

“I was tired of sitting around. It was time to do something,” recalled a community-based activist in Brooklyn’s Little Pakistan. As I listened to him recount his strategy, he next addressed his critics: “I know there are people who don’t agree, but we have to figure something out.” I had already heard numerous appraisals circulating among the different constituencies of the neighborhood. And despite the different arguments for what to do, it was clear that his answer had thus far been the most successful, at least by the standard of participation. Close to the end of the first decade of the Global War on Terrorism, this local activist, who had grown up here, had struck upon what appeared to be a novel idea. Years of scrambling to respond to crisis had created an urgency to turn things around, to change the terms of perception and representation. Throughout New York and across the United States, Islam is considered an adversary of the so-called American way of life, a position that has fostered the vilification and demonization of Islam and Muslims as threats. As a broad-based social formation of animosity, often mistakenly thought to surface only in the margins of social life, such anti-Muslim rhetoric has also come to be a central mode of explanation in political governance and law enforcement. The response by this activist was to put together two groups of people who are thought to be suspicious of one another and who are even thought to despise each other.

In 2010 the idea first came to fruition as a Youth Career Day. The thought behind it was simply interaction and a general sense of acquaintance. And while these were the intended objectives, the implications extended beyond them. This was no ordinary employment fair that is so routinely part of public school education. Some media reports dubbed the event the FBI Muslim Youth Conference. In the auditorium of a local educational institution in Brooklyn, the event brought students from high schools and elementary schools in contact with representatives from local, state, and federal law enforcement, intelligence services, and the armed forces. The students lined up, circulating at the tables where they were introduced to the basics of a crime scene kit, a hazmat suit, SWAT team armor, and weapons, including shields, battering rams, and, surprisingly, stun grenade launchers, which can be used in raids and to control crowds. One of the presentations spoke of gang violence and how to prevent it, using the tropes of black criminality to Muslim youth that served a dual purpose of internalized policing and recruitment to law enforcement. In a classic racial wedge, the hearts-and-minds approach asks Muslim youth and young people to be “good Muslims” who subscribe to the American way of life based in a system of hierarchy that extends through notions of global white supremacy and US empire. That first year the target audi-
ence was Pakistani youth, an oft-cited demographic category of potential radicalization and threat by law enforcement experts that inform the policies of securitization and threat management that organize the War on Terror.¹¹

In the immediate aftermath of 9/11, the deportation regime bore out this threat of potentiality by targeting Pakistanis. Following the decade or so since 2001 Brooklyn’s Little Pakistan had changed dramatically, with massive depletions in the local population and an economic downturn in the commercial area, including shutdowns of restaurants and local businesses. As the activist continued to explain, referring to the implementation of policing practices of surveillance and deportability: “They thought we were the problem, and they didn’t even know us.” In subsequent years the program title replaced Pakistani with Muslim in an attempt to include students from an array of neighborhoods and areas of Brooklyn, thus expanding from an immigrant to religious logic. This mirrored the demographic changes of many local nonprofits that were serving the nearby Bangladeshi neighborhood and the recently arrived Arab and Afghan immigrants and refugees. Finally, the most recent incarnation of the annual program replaced the terms Pakistani and Muslim and used the term youth to include the surrounding areas that are majority communities of color, including neighborhoods that are predominantly black. Many of these young people are also children of immigrants who hail from South Asia, Eastern Europe, Latin America, and the Caribbean. The shift in how the participants were defined reflected a general tendency in terms of the expanding goals of the Youth Career Day by the neighborhood activist and several local organizations. Nonetheless, broadening the category of youth still meant the majority of those who attended were Muslim youth since many of the sponsoring organizations included prominent local mosques, schools, and cultural organizations that brought a predetermined audience from Little Pakistan. For law enforcement this shifting category from Pakistani to Muslim to youth fundamentally reflects ideas of recruitment and provides a platform from which to speak about the policies that emanate from the War on Terror and that substantively expand upon other campaigns, such as the wars on drugs, crime, and gangs.

As was explained to me, neighborhood programs like the job fair are a chance to build trust and awareness in the context of fear and suspicion. Community trust as a metaphor of establishing a police presence within the neighborhood ecologies is meant to shift policing away from militarized approaches of raids, infiltration, and surveillance that are based in constructing the neighborhood as a site of potential terror. The expansion of the program from targeting Muslims to including black youth is an overt policy initiative that expands terror to address crime and drugs,
in order to include a wide array of law enforcement agencies, many of which often collaborate in formation of a task force. As I discuss later in this essay, many who stand by such programs believe that success can be gained by literally making it out of the neighborhood through employment in law enforcement and a range of possible occupations in the security and counterterror state. Ideologically, the impulse of this project maps onto a neoliberal multiculturalism of inclusion that is fundamentally about claiming belonging through social structures and systems of hierarchy.

In May 2011, shortly after the assassination of Osama bin Laden in Pakistan, the conference took place with some of the organizers noting that this military action on the other side of the world was an important turn in counterterror and a context for why Muslims need to become familiar with law enforcement. After a decade of cagey relationships between Muslims across the United States and law enforcement agencies, which more often than not came knocking for the ominous-sounding interview, and more serious detention or even arrest, this was the attempt at a kinder, gentler form of policing.

Despite the scandals of spying and surveillance by several law enforcement agencies, including the New York City Police Department (NYPD) and FBI, with the backing of community-based organizations, religious organizations, and corporate sponsorship, local leaders of the Pakistani and Muslim community continue to participate in this model of interaction with law enforcement and attempts at social transparency—in a strategy of “we have nothing to hide.” Simultaneous to cooperation with law enforcement, the production of terror cases in what Trevor Aaronson calls the “terror factory” to describe law enforcement entrapment have certainly impacted this Brooklyn neighborhood. The recruitment of informers and collaborators is commonplace, in which law enforcement uses the rhetoric of terror in shaping social life as well as in curtailing political activity. Education, exposure, and contact in this context are the scaffolding of a neoliberal multicultural governance used to control sociality and create an appearance of normalization. The idea of uniformity, and even assimilability, while generative, is premised on dismissing racialization and white supremacy as an active process in such encounters with youth and law enforcement in programs and approaches to counterterror. Employment fairs are a scheme for civic participation with law enforcement agencies that have already created analytical perceptions and methods from which to understand the subject populations of the War on Terror. In the immediate sphere of localized social hierarchy, this is a racialized process that involves systematic forms of combining race with ideas of culture and institutions.

To understand how such events relate to the terror-industrial complex, I elaborate the concept of racial becoming in relation to racial infra-
structure. The violence of anti-Muslim racism is linked to the racial logics that I describe as Muslim racial becoming—or, in the logic of a constantly racializing formation, the flexibility of racializing Muslims and Islam. Such collective practices are what I propose in developing a concept of racial infrastructure in which cultural forms and institutions interact in a complex social system of racialization. While my theoretical argument regarding the concept of racial becoming is in conversation with the call for an anthropology of becoming,16 I differ by centering racism and white supremacy. To do so, I think of becoming in relationship to the Fanonian concept of recognition. In the well-known scene of description, Frantz Fanon writes “Look, a Negro,” as the dialectic between being and non-being as a relation of becoming and negation.17 It is in this moment of Fanon’s becoming black that I refer to racial becoming as historicity and futurity. In other words, the process of racialization is imagined as constant becoming in a temporal and spatial context. For Fanon, this racialization of blackness occurs through the body, kinship, and the assumptions of culture.18 In following the Fanonian approach to racial ontology, I argue that racial becoming is an important way to think of how Muslims are racialized under the rubrics of the War on Terror. The burgeoning configuration draws on an older formation that goes to the heart of the complex concept of race. And even at the point of Muslims becoming racialized, this idea of racialization as a process is not exactly complete, but in the figure of the Muslim is always a state of becoming. Identifying who is a Muslim, and such suspicions, is part of the apparatus of racialization and racial becoming. This notion of the Muslim is not only one of religious affiliation and practice but also one that draws on notions of threats that are related to terror in a commonplace logic of the counterterror state based in preemption and potentials. This is a distinct formation related to the racialization of the figure of the Muslim that may be found in other racialized groups but specifically emerges from an anti-Muslim racial formation.

Slavery and antiblackness as global racial formations are pivotal to this theorization but not exclusively in the sense of a prioritization of color. As historiographies of slavery have shown, Muslims and Islam have been part of the US racial formation since its foundations.19 In addition, the rise of the Nation of Islam in the mid-twentieth century and the militant critique associated with Malcolm X, aka el-Hajj Malik el Shabazz, that accentuated the place of Islam and blackness in opposition to white supremacy are key historical components of the racialization of Islam through blackness.20 And yet such genealogies would tend to provide evidence for the formation of anti-Muslim racism as depending on a foundation of antiblackness, and native genocide in terms of the settler colonial history of the United States. Although there are certainly elements of this
here in terms of relationality, I argue that a more encompassing theory of anti-Muslim racism must account for the tactics and strategies of settler colonialism and racial capitalism that have emerged in what Lyko Day recently has called Asian racialization. In this conception, alienage is triangulated with native and settler such that the foreign body of the immigrant Asian is constructed simultaneously through the racial logics of exclusion and elimination. In my formulation, exclusion and elimination deem Muslims under global white supremacy as disposable and subject for removal and death, particularly in the flourishing terror-industrial complex and the system of racial capitalism. Under these circumstances the term Muslim not only is indicative of a faith-based association with Islam but also is an expansive racialized figure of the Muslim that encompasses a range of nationalities, cultures, and religions.

The immediate criticism of a theory of racialization of Muslims is that religious groups cannot be racialized and that Muslims are not a race. Then what is a race? More often than not, visual phenotype and more specifically color are the terms of how race is operationalized. Yet most scholars of race would argue that the concept of race encompasses far more than this. In Michael Omi and Howard Winant’s influential definition, “race is a concept that signifies and symbolizes social conflicts and interests by referring to different types of human bodies.” In the 2015 edition, Omi and Winant add the disclaimer that race is a master category that is portable. By this they mean that race is a “fundamental concept that has profoundly shaped, and continues to shape, the history, polity, economic structure, and culture of the United States.” Race is a “making up of people” that is “portable” across history, spreading “from oppressed group to another and proved transferable to other marginalized identities, social cleavages, and political struggles.” While color and phenotype as naturalized categories of difference are some of the ways that race and racism have been conceptualized, religion is often glossed in this formulation as a structural relationship or a cultural formation from which social groups are categorized. In other words, color and religion are constitutive of a racialized understanding of social difference. Here, I propose that the racialization of Muslims is a flexible process that incorporates the portability of a number of race concepts, such as blackness, indigeneity, colonialism, genocide, immigration, and religion, in a system that appears contradictory and nonsensical. Muslim racial becoming is precisely that: a system of race that is deemed to not be race. In this paradox Muslim racialization perhaps reflects racism but not a racial group; it is always becoming yet will never be. It is a historicity without a futurity because the future is what must be preempted in the language of counterterror. White supremacy as a biopolitical system depends upon multiple and variegated forms of racial becoming. The idea of expansive ontologies, or
what Amit S. Rai has called the being in racial becoming,31 is always in
formation in this concept of becoming and, I would add, is idiosyncratic
in the formation of Muslim racial becoming in the current moment. Race
is certainly always becoming as a progression of teleology for all racialized
groups. In contrast, for Muslim racial becoming, the transformation into
racial formation is constructed as impossible—it just cannot be, and that
is the racial formation of becoming for Muslims. It is a racialization that
denies the existence of Muslim as a racial group because it is argued that it
is a religious group, or because it is multiracial, or because religion is
ideological, and any other number of reasons that perpetuates this tautol-
ogy or racial becoming and racialization. Being stuck in this tautological
reasoning of Muslim racial becoming is precisely the innovation of the
theory of race and racism in the context of terror prevention and logics of
the security state.

Elaborating the lack of futurity in the concept of Muslim racial
becoming in relationship to counterterror, I here turn to the notion of
ontopower as an explanatory framework that Brian Massumi has recently
developed. And while this approach is curiously silent on racial formation,
I find it useful for the theorization of state power as preemptive, an argu-
ment that a number of scholars have referred to in the analysis of post-9/11
temporalities.32 As Massumi argues, “Ontopower is a name for a power
of becoming whose force is maximally abstract: whose power resides in
a ‘conceptual persuasion’ . . . an ontopower is a power of emergence: a
power for the serial production of variations belonging to the same power
curve, or tendency.”33 Further, the power of governance by the counter-
terror state is based in preemption and a conditional logic of a threat of
terror as excess. Massumi calculates that “the surplus-value produced by
the operative logic of preemption is a surplus-value of threat.”34 Even as
the reference to a threat here certainly draws on at least Foucault’s well-
known formulation of the race war, Massumi makes no reference to race
or racism.35 The potential of a future threat is one that entails the use of
ontopower in shaping subjectivity, being and becoming through excess,
that is itself dependent on racialization.

Such potentialities are the operational logic of what anthropologist
Joseph Masco calls “the administration of negative potentials.”36 This
foundational logic of the security state “recognizes threats that allow it
to produce a militarized counterformation and ignores everyday forms of
violence that require other, nonmilitarized forms of governance.”37 The
tandem of militarized and nonmilitarized governance reflects aspects of
the terror-industrial complex in which racial infrastructure becomes an
instrument of counterterror. The normalization of counterterror pre-
sents itself as a dominant field of governance that obfuscates other threats
besides what the security state has constructed as terror. In other words,
as the state has a monopoly on violence, it also has a monopoly on terror. Counterterror governance is a primary apparatus of what I have been calling the terror-industrial complex. I do so to understand how state and nonstate actors are in the business of constructing a planetary “theater of operations” in which counterterror has become “the primary growth industry in the United States in the early twenty-first century.”\(^\text{38}\)

The implementation of ontopower by the counterterror state presents an appearance of an all-encompassing field of power in which subjectivity and becoming are made. Yet what I describe is an uneven process in which racial infrastructures are given to be the disciplinary and biopolitical apparatus of state ontopower for Muslim racial becoming.

The ethnographic vignette with which I began this section describes the racial becoming of Pakistanis\(^\text{39}\) in a frame of the nation-state and nationalism, and Muslims understood as racialized religion, as people of color and people of faith. The idea of Muslim racial becoming as a permanent state is an experiment that I argue places racialized bodies into specific social structures and systems I describe as racial infrastructures. This is to say that the notion of racial becoming is a key part of how racial infrastructure works to frame bodies as potentials of domination and control to mobilize racial schemas while denying that race is at work. Different from color blindness, this approach simply states that opposition to Islam is ideological.\(^\text{40}\) In some ways Muslim racial becoming is about a kind of visibility in liberal political systems in which difference in multicultural structures is a veritable seat at the table of democratic inclusion, not as people of color but as people of faith. It is thus that the language of racism and hence antiracism is foreclosed in the possibility of organizing in terms of racial solidarity and broad-based multiracial alliance. Rather than thinking of racism as exclusion, inclusion is fundamentally about the racial state and the incorporation into the racial social order without ever having a clear base as a racialized group. Thus, as Islam and Muslims are racialized under the white supremacist state, the innovation of not being a racial group but a faith group obscures how racializing Islam is a tactic that has repercussions far beyond Muslims. The figure of the Muslim enables the policing of people of color at an ever-expanding level that builds upon the preemptive logic of the War on Terror while it continuously operates from within the figures of criminality and social death that depend on the racialization of black and brown bodies. In this formulation, racial becoming is what racial infrastructures seek to create. Muslim racial becoming implements racialization while also providing an alibi for policing as an ever-expanding horizon.
The Nonbeing of Racial Infrastructure

In the colonies the economic infrastructure is also a superstructure.
—Frantz Fanon, *The Wretched of the Earth*

In contrast to a definition of becoming as constant transformation in a liberal teleology, Muslim racial becoming is nonbecoming, a negation that is a condition akin to what Fanon called nonbeing.\(^4\) In a spatial sense, entire neighborhoods can be understood as zones of nonbeing that for Fanon was a summation of the colonial divide. Zones of nonbeing are made into a racial category: Little Pakistan is a site of surveillance, terror prevention, and even dissent. In other words, the figure of the Muslim is what compels a comprehension of racialization in relation to terror threats, potentials, and preemption, among other things. Even as such places are ethnic enclaves of the quintessential American city, they are global, transnational, and representative of social relations that are informed by US imperial wars abroad.\(^2\) Muslims in the global city of New York are not only imagined in relation to other people of color but also racialized at a global level.\(^3\) Through events such as Youth Career Day with military, intelligence, and law enforcement, Pakistani and Muslim youth in Brooklyn are offered a glimpse into the battlegrounds of the War on Terror, as they are also invited to participate as part of the racial infrastructure that would assign them a place within the social structure of the US racial formation. Perhaps as law enforcement, maybe as security, or even as a soldier, participation is global in a permanent state of war. Racial infrastructure relies on spatiality at multiple levels of scale that connect a local neighborhood in Brooklyn to the rest of the world through the War on Terror.

As a legal advocate who has been working in Little Pakistan for several decades told me, “People are dealing with racism all the time, mainly because they are Pakistani and because they are Muslim.” The categories of difference—Pakistani and Muslim—attached to racism speak to multiple meanings that are often conflated as singular. As we continued to talk, it became apparent that racism in the legal sense that is often articulated to this local activist is constructed in terms of acts of extreme violence and bodily harm. These are typically described as public acts that occur openly on the streets of the neighborhood or in commercial areas, including places of work, and result in severe bodily harm. Gas stations, local eateries, and schools are the places from which such violence takes place through physical harm, bodily injury, and verbal abuse. For many of the local inhabitants of Little Pakistan who are seeking legal recourse, increasingly the narrative of such violence has been attached specifically to the critique of racism, one that reflects generational changes, an expanded
activist discourse, and the level of the violence that is embedded in everyday life. Such extreme acts are on a much broader continuum of everyday violence in which neighborhoods are contained through the boundary making of racism and as zones of nonbeing that pivot between racial becoming and nonbecoming. In relation to this, historian Natalia Molina argues for a notion of racial scripts that are the cultural representations and institutional structures and practices that culminate in “attitudes, practices, customs, policies, and laws.”\(^44\) In relationship to lawmakers and policy, Molina describes what she refers to as a racist infrastructure in which “racial scripts serve as a means of embedding attitudes into laws, policies, and institutions.”\(^45\) As my discussions with legal activists demonstrate, the language of identifying racism is itself a racial script from which to understand the already racialized infrastructures that many of those in Pakistani Brooklyn navigate. For example, addressing racial violence through the framework of the law depends on evidence of harm. Yet an enormous range of racist violence is not captured by such claims and is instead produced and managed by racial infrastructures.

Although I examine the repercussions of the terror-industrial complex among Pakistani Muslims in Brooklyn, the impact of this approach is applicable to a range of communities of color that have been the object of such policing and disciplining practices. In following this trajectory of infrastructure as forms of being and sociality, I argue raciosity as an infrastructure is fundamentally about bodies as a materiality, a discursive arrangement, and a relation of/to power. By expanding on the recent theorization of the anthropology of infrastructure,\(^46\) I am interested in how Masco describes infrastructure as “not only the material structures that support social life in complex urban societies but also . . . the imaginative and affective contexts that enable fear to be nationalized in specific terms.”\(^47\) Racial infrastructure as social infrastructure speaks to a difference in philosophical and intellectual bearing of how concepts of ontological and epistemological difference are to be understood and the primacy of racism and white supremacy.\(^48\) Masco continues by arguing that “infrastructure is the enabling architecture of a system . . . it is . . . a lived structure, offering the naturalized conditions of possibility of everyday life.”\(^49\)

Take, for example, the interrelationship of sporting cultures and policing. Since 2008 the NYPD has been sponsoring a citywide cricket league that mainly targets youth from South Asia and the Caribbean. A parallel soccer league was created that same year that garnered the support of Arab American organizations until 2011, when it was revealed that the NYPD was using these leagues to monitor Arab, Muslim, and South Asian youth. Leaked documents from the infamous NYPD intelligence wing called the Demographics Unit, initially assembled under for-
mer commissioner Ray Kelly, show that officers were using the leagues as surveillance and outreach. The documents map parks where cricket and soccer are usually played with the ethnic and national characteristics of the players. Similar mapping projects were revealed with information about ethnic hot spots, including cafes, restaurants, and public places. The list of ancestries of interest included Arab and South Asian countries and the category American black Muslim. Here the racialization of potential terror is glossed as profiling of national background coupled with a clear racial and religious categorization. Although many have assumed the presence of undercover agents, the personnel of the sports leagues were often attached to the NYPD and could have easily reported such details as player backgrounds to the Demographics Unit. Even as these details are important in terms of how information was gathered, what is further revealing toward an analysis of racial infrastructure is what kind of information was collected and how it was imagined in relation to commonplace ideas of the US racial formation. Sports leagues become a fairly straightforward way to collect background information, not to mention player statistics. What is unclear, however, is how these formal youth sports leagues might have been used to observe informal and amateur leagues of adult players that often played in the same park.

The sports leagues themselves functioned to collect information but were also an important site of racial infrastructure as part of everyday life. For those already accustomed to the workings of the surveillance state, the background information and surveillance become banal, while the support of the mayor’s office and the NYPD are a way to engage in a collective space of sports and sociality. Many hoped that even after official support waned the leagues themselves would gain a local audience that would garner an endorsement in the long term. For the Pakistani neighborhood the choice of cricket, while also a legitimate and practical one for the reality of its local enthusiasm, also revealed a global logic that placed cricket outside the norm of US sporting cultures. Cricket, while enthusiastically followed by diasporic populations in the United States, is far from popular as a mainstream US sport. In other words, the choice of cricket has its own othering effects that render it foreign and outside quintessentially American sporting cultures, a furthering of the nonbeing of the racial infrastructures at work in creating spaces of state-sanctioned activity.

Regardless of the outcry from Muslim organizations and leaders, the NYPD sports leagues continue to flourish. As one coach in the cricket league reported, the chance for youth to play in these leagues meant that they were traveling to many of the boroughs across New York City to established and well-known cricket pitches where other leagues had been playing for years before the NYPD cricket leagues were launched. For
many of the young players this was an opportunity to leave the neighborhood and see other parts of the city. As the brainchild of one of the NYPD personnel who grew up in Little Pakistan, the sports leagues, similar to the employment fairs with law enforcement, are imagined as a space to overcome the problems of how Muslims are demonized. This idea of reconciliation and getting to know one another was almost always described as an important process of inclusion. In the case of the Muslim Youth Conference, law enforcement, intelligence, and US armed forces were invited at the behest of a nonprofit community organization that receives federal, state, and local funding to create such spaces. Similarly, despite the revelations of the Associated Press reporting of the surveillance and secret intelligence operations of the NYPD, the sports leagues are thought to have an important role as a source of social outreach given the limited opportunities for engagement and travel across the city with other youth. As a sign of the ordinary aspects of how such racial infrastructure is commonplace, Muslim youth can be seen in the neighborhood of Little Pakistan wearing NYPD-sponsored T-shirts and using paraphernalia handed out at events like the job fair, during religious holidays, and for participants in these various activities. This is not to say, however, that the fear and paranoia of law enforcement informants have abated—if anything, it has become a part of everyday life. As racial infrastructures of the inhabitants of these neighborhoods, the law enforcement job fair and the NYPD cricket league are messy affairs in which narratives of overcoming and inclusion are the mechanisms of surveillance and racial profiling for potential threats, or what I have described above as racial infrastructures of Muslim racial becoming.

The Laboratory: Policing and Pakistani Brooklyn

“The undercommons is therefore always an unsafe neighborhood.
—Stefano Harney and Fred Moten, *The Undercommons*

“I know all the dirty stuff that happens in the neighborhood,” one NYPD officer originally from Little Pakistan told me. This knowledge was enough for him to safeguard the lives of his family by moving out. For his kids, he thought of a different future of middle-class mobility that meant they could not be exposed to the goings-on of the neighborhood he grew up in. His indictment of the social failures of the neighborhood included the schools, the housing options, and even the mosque community. He disparaged the schools for not offering him a better education, claimed available housing was substandard and dilapidated, and denounced the mosque leaders as caught up in the past. When I asked him if he felt a commitment to the people in the neighborhood he left behind, he replied
with absolute confidence that he had made the right decision for his family and finished this critique: “This neighborhood will never change.”

A far different assessment of the neighborhood came from the activist mentioned at the beginning of this essay, who felt he had to do something, who had both grown up in and still returned to Little Pakistan. Deportation raids, special task force surveillance, and spying have made Little Pakistan a laboratory for how the Global War on Terrorism polices Muslims. This became apparent in my fieldwork as I began to follow the trail of harassment and policing in Brooklyn’s Little Pakistan, whose inhabitants are primarily working class and working poor. Speaking to a number of community-based activists, I was made aware of the complex lineage of many Pakistani immigrants who found themselves the target of police harassment and interrogation. A few were leftists and former trade unionists in Pakistan who fled to the United States in the 1960s and 1970s after facing state persecution, only to find themselves in the same predicament decades later. Others were tied to the struggle for Kashmiri liberation and ostensibly implicated in a complex web at the whims of the CIA, state department, and Pakistani intelligence services known as Inter-Services Intelligence. Rather than terror being policed, it is everyday life that is policed in a broad net that imagines Muslims as potential terrorists, and ironically as radicals in the shifting meaning of this word from leftist to terrorist.53

In two separate accounts I heard of Pakistani men who were green card holders and had been living in the United States for decades who were targets of raids that involved joint task forces of local law enforcement and the FBI. Both were released following detention. While it was unclear why they were targeted, they reported that they faced similar harassment by local police at an everyday level. In one example, a cab driver was frequently stopped by the NYPD under stop-and-frisk policies that were used for suspected terrorism. He compared this experience with that of other cab drivers who did not face similar harassment and interpreted this as a sign that he was targeted, surmising his name was on a watch list. His explanation for the harassment was straightforward. As he explained in Urdu, he always wore shalwar kameez, a long shirt and baggy pant combination, and had a long gray beard. He continued that he always felt more comfortable wearing the clothing of his country and that he had a right to do so. But because this clothing now meant something attached to the idea of terrorism, he was subject to what he called racial profiling, using the words in English. He was guessing that someone must have reported his past involvement with leftist politics to the local police, and that information had made its way to the FBI. It was a sobering assessment of the predicament that sounded superficially based on clothing but was deeply based in racial formation. That he was unsure about
why he was targeted by law enforcement demonstrates the disciplinary power of policing. This is not an unusual story filled with critical analysis of neighborhood surveillance and racism that has become an everyday encounter. As a social landscape such spaces have become laboratories in which the tools of the terror-industrial complex can mobilize forms of racial social control such as incapacitation and the notion of the potentials of racial becoming through a broad explanation of preemption and anti-radicalization. These are certainly not new tactics and have been used in communities of color for some time. What is perhaps remarkable about this is that it is not understood as racist in the same way and has even entered into an acceptable logic of necessary precaution as a biopolitical and disciplinary apparatus of terrorist prevention. In the management of violence, racism that is not seen as racism is rationalized as part of safety and security. Even further, racial infrastructures do this dual work of racialization and obscuring the process of racial becoming for Muslims in Pakistani Brooklyn.

The everyday experience of racialized policing describes the shifts in social structure that are part of a program of state-sanctioned social change in the neighborhood. The implication of the War on Terror is based in the assumption of taking sides, particularly in the promise of freedom attached to immigrant assimilability. With limited options for economic mobility in immigrant enclaves, youth of color turn to law enforcement as an option for professional service. The NYPD, for example, has recruited and employed many 1.5- and second-generation youth specifically from neighborhoods such as Little Pakistan. Predating the Youth Career Day with law enforcement, several neighborhood youth were groomed to work for various antiterror task forces and the infamous Demographic Unit, including as detectives, officers, public relations representatives, and cultural attachés. In other words, the idea of “doing something” has also meant different things, including in these examples neoliberal and multicultural inclusion and more racially liberalist bootstrap models of assimilation. For the last few decades the NYPD, much like many other urban police forces across the United States, has found a solution to policing in ethnic neighborhoods by incorporating a racially diverse workforce.

In my research I came across a number of NYPD officers who were of Pakistani origin and grew up in the Little Pakistan neighborhood. As I was told by some of these officers, their placement was related to their local status, and also something that they themselves portrayed as part of their expertise. Having grown up in these areas of Brooklyn, and the added detail of their specific cultural background, gave them a specialized knowledge related to the neighborhood. This included language capabilities in Urdu and Punjabi, spoken by those of Pakistani origin, and an intimate knowledge of the social networks and social structure of the
Muslim community. Uniformly, they spoke of a narrative of making it out of the neighborhood when faced with limited educational and employment options after high school. This was contrasted with the conservatism of the mosque leadership and the elders of the neighborhood that they claimed refused to assimilate and become American, even as these police officers were quite cognizant of their difference in relation to the norms of whiteness.

In an obvious way, assimilation means accepting a racial order at the center of the War on Terror, and a liberal individualism that opposes what is portrayed as the cultural naïveté of older generations that supposedly refused to change and stayed Pakistani. Such cultural notions of progress and change are formed in a dissonance of the ways of life that are thought to be incommensurable. The process of assimilation, and the attempt to assimilate, is uncritically constructed as American and in pursuit of an unattainable whiteness, or even honorary whiteness, as in the model minority racial frame. By creating a narrow range of political and social possibility, these social structures of compliance to an established racial hierarchy are reproduced as engagement and participation. The narrative of assimilation and job security for many of these NYPD employees is often placed within the motif of migration and upward mobility. As I was often told, many parents in this neighborhood who came as immigrants did so with the intention of creating greater life chances for their children. Espousing assimilationist values in the pursuit of job security and upward mobility in the face of limited options after graduating high school and college, joining the NYPD, or, for that matter, working as an informant guarantees a salary under the constraints of limited opportunities that have much to do with structural access to education and employment.

While maintaining the expertise of firsthand knowledge of the social organization of Little Pakistan, culture is deployed in a rudimentary fashion that essentializes American and Pakistani as incommensurable categories that speak to racial difference and the assumptions of a given social order of assimilation and assimilability. David H. Price has outlined how structural functionalism is deployed by the US military in which culture is an object, a thing to be manipulated, deployed toward dominating populations and societies. In a similar vein, Roberto J. González has argued that this culturalist approach within military intelligence and human terrain systems draws on a history connected to domestic counter-insurgency developed in the 1950s for the FBI. In much the same fashion, the NYPD has adopted the methods of a quasi-scientific approach developed by the CIA to police local immigrant communities in the New York area, including the mapping of specific neighborhoods through the use of informants and rakers, individuals tasked to collect a range of social information from observation and listening to conversations, to obtain
banal information about dress, habits, and religious doctrine, and faith-based student organizations. The culturalist approach in many ways fits into the narrative of assimilation that the NYPD officers repeated using the pithy aphorisms of protection and the law. As they explained their reasons for joining the police, they drew on familiar phrases: to protect and serve, catching bad guys and lawbreakers, and creating something good for the people of the neighborhood when given the chance. Maintaining the American way of life demands policing populations deemed threats to the hierarchy of the US racial formation. Here racial infrastructures are a possibility of a way out provided by the NYPD, or sponsoring a sporting league through which to provide Muslim youth an opportunity to participate in sanctioned activities. To become a police officer is to become an agent of the racial state from which other options of mobility emerge and racial formation is reinforced.

The Undercommons of Terror

In a way, this apparatus that combines racial becoming with racial infrastructure is not lost on those who aspire to making it, getting out, and overcoming. To approach these aspirations, innovation and ingenuity are the maneuvers that define the social structures of possibility with racial becoming and racial infrastructures. Job fairs and sports leagues as racial infrastructures of the terror-industrial complex are fundamentally forms of innovation that are familiar and well known. And while this is the language of a racial liberalism, this is far more complicated in the policing mechanisms that normalize such racial logics of neoliberal multiculturalism into the rubrics of racial capitalism. This is a familiar tale of racialization, and yet the details of how racial becoming has worked to place Muslims in a state of limbo, of ongoing and seemingly permanent stasis as a suspect population, are part of the turn that connects ontopower to a constantly future tense. Far from complete, it is emergent, with a new turn about to appear.

The racial infrastructure of what Stefano Harney and Fred Moten have brilliantly described as the undercommons possesses a limited sense of possibility when coupled with the impact of the terror-industrial complex. As they cogently describe “the ultimate goal of counterinsurgency everywhere: to turn the insurgents into state agents,” the radical possibility of social worlds and projects in which transformation is a critique becomes increasingly impossible. Far from being isolated, the terror industry is pervasive and increasingly influential, as evidenced in the shifts of public opinion and policy development since 9/11. Yet, another lesson of my fieldwork in general is that radical spaces of incommensurability thrive in opposition to these grand systems of inequality. And
although Brooklyn’s Little Pakistan has become a lab for the expanses of US empire and the Global War on Terrorism, the social possibilities of survival in everyday life continue to rub against these technologies of policed social engineering. What I have described here ethnographically in terms of racial infrastructure and the terror-industrial complex speaks to the challenge of racialization in the post-9/11 era based in state power to manipulate social life through structural violence and the shifting spatial and temporal possibilities of politics. Throughout this essay I have also framed my theoretical intervention in relationship to social actors who were doing something, whether as part of an assessment of collective need or through the possibilities of individual life chances. The challenge is to reformulate what I have already described as the potentials of racial becoming into different possibilities. Much of what I detail in this neighborhood is the result of intentional and deliberate transformations of social life that are not simply in a fixed social structure. Rather, social life in this Brooklyn neighborhood is far more profuse and multitudinous than I have space to discuss here, given my focus on attempts to shape sociality. Racial infrastructures are but one example of bending Muslim racial becoming, something that still presents itself as having many possibilities.

Notes

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1. Quoted in Isaacson, “GQ Icon.”
3. It is important to note that Risen is a journalist who works for the New York Times, whose editors have stalled or censored his reporting on US surveillance and the intelligence-gathering activities based on the whims of the US government. Many of his revelations that did not appear in the New York Times subsequently appeared in books he published, such as State of War: The Secret History of the CIA and the Bush Administration (2006) and Pay Any Price: Greed, Power, and Endless War (2014). In 1999 Risen also controversially reported on the Wen Ho Lee case for the New York Times, which later led to an apology by the newspaper for several factual inaccuracies and significant errors.
5. Ibid. See also, e.g., Priest and Arkin, Top Secret America; Aaronson, Terror Factory; Apuzzo and Goldman, Enemies Within; and Greenwald, No Place to Hide.
6. In thinking through the connections among military, prison, and terror, I
follow a long line of important theorization of abolition; see, e.g., Davis, *Are Prisons Obsolete?*; James, *Resisting State Violence*; Gilmore, *Golden Gulag*; and Alexander, *New Jim Crow*.


12. For example, in a March 2010 statement presented by a representative of the FBI to the House Committee on Homeland Security, this reasoning is repeated as an effort at community outreach. The immediate justification is to connect with Muslim communities across the United States, including in Brooklyn’s Little Pakistan, to disrupt and prevent terror, crime, and radicalized behavior. Antiradicalization has since taken a significant turn in terms of the initiatives of the White House, such as the Summit on Countering Violent Extremism. See testimony by Brett Hovington, chief of the FBI Community Relations Unit, 17 March 2010, www.fbi.gov/news/testimony/working-with-communities-to-disrupt-terror-plots.


14. I describe these dynamics and the impact on political practices of dissent in this neighborhood in the case of Syed Ghulam Nabi Fai, a freedom fighter for Kashmiri liberation and self-determination, in “Policing Kashmiri Brooklyn.”

15. For example, in *Represent and Destroy* Jodi Melamed argues that such strategies are different ways to rationalize and normalize the systematic violence of racial capitalism.

16. Biehl and Locke, “Deleuze and the Anthropology of Becoming”; Ralph, *Renegade Dreams*. The ideas of becoming, multiplicity, and affirmation that Gilles Deleuze develops throughout his work are central to this formulation. See Deleuze, *Nietzsche and Philosophy*. See also “Life-Times of Becoming Human,” in which Neferti X. M. Tadiar argues that becoming human in a time of war is related to the notion of lifetimes and disposability.


18. Fanon, *Black Skin, White Masks*, 112. Describing such a colonial ethnology Fanon uses his characteristic biting prose: “I was responsible for my body, for my race, for my ancestors. I subjected myself to an objective examination, I discovered my blackness, my ethnic characteristics; and I was battered down by tom-toms, cannibalism, intellectual deficiency, fetishism, racial defects, slave-ships, and above all else above all: ‘Sho’ good eatin’ ” (ibid.).


21. See, e.g., Ronald A. T. Judy’s comparison of the racialization of the Negro in the United States and the Muslim in Europe in “Democracy or Ideology.” Following this argument, Alexander G. Weheliye in *Habeas Viscus* builds on this idea of
racialization to draw on how political relations of the Muslim and Negro are part of what he calls racializing assemblages.

24. Counter to this, Moustafa Bayoumi in “Racing Religion” argues that the relationship of race and religion is institutionalized into legal categories for state formations of race making.

26. Ibid., 106.
27. Ibid., 108.

29. Leerom Medovoi has called this “dogma-line racism,” as opposed to color-line racism, which is broadly ideological. See Medovoi, “Dogma-Line Racism,” 45. Expanding on this idea, religion scholars have looked to the theological origins of how white supremacy and racism emerged in Christianity to racialized religious groups through color. For example, J. Kameron Carter in *Race* argues that, in the context of European modernity, Christian theologians biologized ideas of religiosity particularly in relationship to Judaism and ultimately created a racialized anti-Judaic white supremacy. Similarly, Medovoi, in “Dogma-Line Racism,” follows the arguments of Gil Anidjar to describe how Islam has become a theological enemy of the Christian West to describe the anti-Muslim racial formation. See Anidjar, *The Jew, the Arab*. For an earlier take on this development of how the race concept emerged from a history of anti-Muslim and anti-Jewish sentiment and the formation of white Christian supremacy, see Rana, “Story of Islamophobia.”

30. This is somewhat analogous to Eduardo Bonilla-Silva’s “racism without racists.” However, while I agree with the argument regarding racial structures, my argument regarding racial becoming and racial infrastructure is more akin to the theory of racism that Moon-Kie Jung develops in *Beneath the Surface of White Supremacy* regarding racial schemas and corresponds to the racial projects of Omi and Winant (*Racial Formation*) and the racial scripts described by Natalia Molina (*How Race Is Made in America*).

34. Ibid., 225.
35. Compare with Jasbir K. Puar’s critical use of Massumi, particularly in the invocation of Muslim racialization as incipient, in *Terrorist Assemblages*, 160.
37. Ibid., 27.
38. Ibid., 198.
39. The religious diversity of Little Pakistan in Brooklyn includes significant Pakistani Christian populations and division according to Islamic sect, including Sunni, Shia, and Ahmadi, and numerous schools or approaches, including Sufi, Deo-
bandi, and Wahhabi. Of course, there are also those who do not have a religious affiliation or are not practicing and still identify as Pakistani through national culture. Nonetheless, I argue that all of this heterogeneity is made uniform as the racialized figure of the Muslim.

40. Such an argument goes back to the foundational scholarship of Edward W. Said, in which orientalism was always an implicit racism based on framing liberal modernity against Islam. See Said’s works Orientalism, Covering Islam, and Culture and Imperialism.

41. Fanon, Black Skin, White Masks, 8. Also see the chapter “Writing through the Zone of Nonbeing” in Gordon, What Fanon Said, 19–46. On colonial spatial divisions, see Fanon, Wretched of the Earth, 4–7.

42. Sassen, Global City; Manalansan, “Race, Violence, and Neoliberal Spatial Politics.”

43. In “Globality of Af-Pak” I explore some of Denise Ferreira da Silva’s thinking in “No-Bodies” regarding globality and militarized policing.

44. Molina, How Race Is Made in America, 7

45. Ibid., 56.

46. Larkin, Signal and Noise; Larkin, “Politics and Poetics of Infrastructure.”

47. Masco, Theater of Operations, 28.

48. Jung, Beneath the Surface of White Supremacy; Goldberg, Racist Culture; Mills, Racial Contract; Omi and Winant, Racial Formation; da Silva, “No-Bodies.”


50. These documents are catalogued at Apuzzo and Goldman’s Enemies Within website, under site 11 (at enemieswithinbook.com/document_legend/, accessed 10 August 2016).

51. For example, Asian American sporting cultures can also be seen as sites of everyday resistance and transformation. See Thangaraj, Arnaldo, and Chin, Asian American Sporting Cultures.


53. Rana, “Terror.”

54. Price, Weaponizing Anthropology.

55. González, American Counterinsurgency; González, Militarizing Culture.


57. Harney and Moten, Undercommons.

58. Ibid., 38.

References


